




NAVAL SCHOOL OF AVIATION SAFETY

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**CDR J. P. NILES
LCDR D. J. KELLY
SAS REPORTING INSTRUCTORS**



Admiral's Corner by *RADM George Mayer*

The Blue Threat—Our Deadliest Enemy

Our nation is at war. Those of us in uniform know that better than anyone. It is a complex war being fought on many fronts. It is a different kind of war, unlike any other we have waged. Yet, one reality in this war remains constant, a theme played out in every other conflict in modern American history: The vast majority of our aviation losses are not because of engagements with enemy forces. Our losses overwhelmingly are due to mishaps.

How do we deal with this terribly consistent trend? When we prepare for combat, we train to win against a defined threat. We expect to face an opposing force: an enemy force, a red force. We study the threats the anticipated force might present. We devise tactics to defeat the Red Threat. We train to and modify our tactics depending on the part of the world, the time of year, and the time of day we expect to fight. Our tactical ingenuity is focused on fighting potential enemy forces, potential Red Threats. The result? The most potent fighting force in history.

Our aviation team is very good at what we do, and the fighting forces that comprise naval aviation have no equal. The only forces that appear to diminish our ability to successfully carry out our assigned mission are the United States Navy and Marine Corps. We continue to take ourselves out with deadly precision, through errors, lapses and poor decisions. The Class-A mishaps are the result of our actions against ourselves. In FY06, as of Sept. 7, naval aviation has had 25 Class-A mishaps, with the loss of 21 aircrew, and 17 aircraft, at a cost of almost \$508 million. Contrast this to direct-enemy action (DEA) combat losses from the Red Threat, as we fight the Global War on Terrorism, which consist of one AH-1W and two aircrew lost.

Our losses to the Blue Threat we face each day have not significantly diminished in more than a decade. Our aviation mishap rate is relatively flat. How can we change this? What can we do to achieve the next drop in the mishap rate?

We must view the hazards we face every day, in training or in our everyday lives, in the same way we view our enemies: as real threats. What if we were to always treat low visibility or wet runways as a threat (with the ability to take out an FA-18) equal to that of a surface-to-air missile? What if we viewed fatigue-impaired decisions as a threat as dangerous as an anti-aircraft-artillery piece? What if we approached the threat of following too closely in automobile traffic or the reckless drivers who cut you off on the highway in the same way we deliver weapons inside a Red-Threat envelope? We need to treat the threats we can control, the Blue Threats, with the same energy we approach fighting the Red Threats. Because today, Blue Threats—our errors and poor decisions—are our deadliest enemies.

In this issue of Approach, we officially recognize Blue Threat. Each article tells a story of what went wrong and how the aircrew survived. If you analyze each story, the themes are very familiar: communication (internal and external to aircraft) confusion, preflight planning and briefing weaknesses, complacency, and a lack of assertiveness, to name a few. I invite you to be a “Monday morning quarterback” and analyze the stories and identify the hazards, or Blue Threat, that contributed to the situation. What you’ve learned about ORM and CRM will be

evident as you read. We want you to think as much about defeating our deadliest of enemies as we do at the Safety Center.

The men and women of naval aviation are war fighters in the truest sense of the word. We can win the war against the Blue Threat. It will take dedication, determination and courage, but we have plenty of that.

Reporting Overview

It is important to understand why we must report Mishaps and HAZREPs so we can understand the importance and impact reporting makes on Naval Aviation. For one it is a requirement to report, directed by the Department of Defense to all the Service Chiefs via Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 6055.07. DoDI 6055.07 subject is: "Mishap Notification, Investigation, Reporting and Record keeping". The Instruction discusses the requirements for reporting and sets the threshold for Mishaps. From this Instruction the Naval Safety Center (NSC) has developed the OPNAVINST 3750.6 (Series), specific to Naval Aviation Mishaps, and OPNAVINST 5102.1 (Series) for all other Naval Mishaps. The instructions are OPNAVINST (CNO instructions) but are developed and updated for the CNO by NSC. The instruction sets the policies for investigating and reporting Mishaps and Hazards. The 3750.6 and the 5102.1 differ greatly in their investigation and reporting bodies. The 3750.6 requires an ASO be a member of an AMB for all Mishap investigations while the 5102.1 has no requirement for a board nor a trained Safety Officer to be a member except for a Class A in which a three member board is called to investigate. It is important to have an understanding of 5102.1 as all other Mishaps not involving an aircraft will require a report under this instruction. This course will only cover the requirements of the 3750.6.

Another reason we must report is to document known or potential Hazards to the fleet. When a Hazard is identified (material, training, pubs, procedures, etc.) if a HAZREP is never initiated the Hazard remains undocumented. Without documentation the decision makers have no evidence or reason to make a change or spend money on a problem. It is vital to the NAVAIR process and to higher headquarter that Hazards are reported to document a problem and determine the

frequency and possible severity of the Hazard. We must report to document our Hazards.

Finally, a reason we must report is to share our knowledge and our experiences with the fleet. If a hazard occurs in your squadron then the potential is there for it to occur elsewhere. It could be possible that the Hazard could occur in your community or it could be a hazard that could occur in any community. It is vital to share our experiences with the fleet and to warn them of possible dangers/Hazards they might encounter. Just as if we know where the enemy is located and we want to inform our comrades of his location, HAZREPs inform the fleet of the enemy in the form of hazards.

As you can see it is vital to the Naval Mission that Hazards and Mishaps are investigated and recommendations (mitigations) are developed to prevent reoccurrence. Mishaps and Hazards have different investigating and reporting requirements but each is equally important to Safety. The only real difference is a Mishap reached a threshold either monetarily or by extent of injury and a HAZREP did not.

Reporting Chain and Responsibilities

In order to report you must understand the processes, authority and role of various members in the reporting process. Let's start at the top of the process and work our way down. This discussion is a summary of each member's role in the reporting process but the 3750 gives a clear definition of each member's role and their responsibilities.

The Naval Safety Center is the command that is directed to set policy regarding safety investigations and reporting requirements. If there is ever a question as to if or when to report you are never wrong to call NSC and get advice. They write the 3750 and can give you the best advice and support regarding 3750

policy. They are also there to support in investigations and data requests.

The next member to discuss is the Controlling Custodian. The controlling custodian is defined in the 3750 but an example is COMNAVAIRPAC or COMMARFORPAC. These are commands led by a three or two star and have large staffs. They are tasked with a variety of responsibilities in the 3750. It is important that you know who your Controlling Custodian is as they will support the investigation in various ways. The controlling custodian is tasked with the oversight of all aircraft within their responsibility. They will most likely endorse any Safety Investigation Report (SIR) and may endorse a HAZREP if it is assessed to have a risk of 1 or 2 or requires action external to the Chain of Command.

Operational Chain of Command plays a role in the reporting process. They are there to support the investigation and assist an AMB if required. At times they may be required to appoint the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) and are often a part of the Mishap endorsement process.

The Reporting Custodian is normally the commanding officer. They are tasked with ensuring the aircraft under their command are reported upon as directed by 3750. When a Mishap occurs it is the responsibility of the Reporting Custodian to report the Mishap in accordance with 3750. Fault does not matter regarding a Mishap. The only way a reporting custodian can remove his responsibility from reporting on an aircraft is to transfer the aircraft to another reporting custodian.

The Appointing Authority is another responsibility that normally falls on the commanding officer. The appointing authority appoints the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB). The Appointing Authority shall have a standing board designated in writing. The appointing authority can be moved to a higher command if the commanding officer is involved in a Mishap. The reason is to remove any idea that the CO had any influence in the

board's findings. If he were to appoint the board for a Mishap he was involved in then many would question the integrity of the SIR.

The AMB is appointed by the appointing authority to investigate and report on the findings for all mishaps. It is made up of five members. The board should be designated in writing and trained to investigate and report on any Mishap the reporting custodian may encounter.

AMB members are designated in writing by the appointing authority and are tasked to investigate and determine the causes of a mishap and to give recommendations to mitigate the risk of reoccurrence. The members must be commissioned officer (except for UAS where E-6 and above may be member of a board). Civil Service personnel in designated aviation safety billets in naval aviation commands may serve as AMB members. The five members include a senior member (Must be more senior to the pilot in command or mission commander), someone well qualified in aircraft operations, someone well qualified in aircraft maintenance, a flight surgeon and an ASO. The board must be trained in investigations and the reporting process as well as have an understanding of WAMHRS, 3750 and need to be trained in the execution of the pre-mishap plan from the perspective of the mishap investigation.

The following excerpts from the OPNAVINST 3750.6 (series) provide general information on the Naval Aviation Safety Program and are intended for instructional purposes only and shall not be used to supplement the actual instruction, changes or updates.

101. Purpose. This instruction issues the Naval Aviation SMS. The Commander, Naval Safety Center (COMNAVSAFECEN), who is also Special Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for Safety Matters (OPNAV N09F), manages the Naval Aviation SMS under the auspices of this instruction. This instruction applies to all military and civilian personnel in every Navy and Marine Corps aviation activity throughout naval aviation and some organizations that are not traditional aviation activities that operate manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Since safety is an inherent responsibility of command, the Naval Aviation SMS is implemented by, and carried out by all personnel engaged in naval aviation operations throughout the chain of command. General reporting requirements can found in appendix A.

102. Program Policy. The purpose of the Naval Aviation SMS is to enhance operational readiness by preserving lives, preventing injury, and protecting equipment and material. The Naval Aviation SMS supports every aspect of naval aviation. Safety practices leverage combat readiness. Fleet personnel will discover naval aviation SMS knowledge and practice may be extended into other areas of Department of the Navy (DON) personnel life. The Naval Aviation SMS may, therefore, yield benefits and preserve resources far beyond its intended scope.

103. Objective of the Program. The Naval Aviation SMS succeeds by preventing damage and injury. Potential causes of damage and injury are termed hazards. The goal of the Naval Aviation SMS is to maximize mission effectiveness through the elimination or control of hazards, thus managing risk to an acceptable level and thereby preventing mishaps.

104. Scope of the Program

a. The Naval Aviation SMS encompasses all activities which detect, contain, or eliminate hazards in naval aviation. These activities include:

(1) Manned aircraft and UAV and UAS design, research, development, test, evaluation, procurement, modification, maintenance, servicing, and operations. OPNAVINST 3750.6S 13 May 14 1-2

(2) Manned aircraft and UAV and UAS support equipment, facilities, supplies, and weapons.

(3) Personnel selection, training, education, clothing, and equipment.

(4) Advertising the Naval Aviation SMS for training, raising awareness, and rewarding successes.

(5) Policies, procedures, instructions, directives, and publications.

(6) Reporting, analysis, and process improvement.

b. However, to be truly effective, this program must transcend these boundaries and be part of the culture that is naval aviation. An effective safety program requires everyone associated with naval aviation to shun the minimum requirements and adopt an active safety culture constantly renewed by fresh ideas.

c. The SMS promotes an integrated, system of systems approach to safety. New requirements, tools, programs or systems should not be introduced into naval aviation or the SMS without thorough analysis. The analysis should determine whether the need is already met by an existing element or elements within naval aviation or the SMS itself, how the new element will be integrated within and support the naval aviation and the SMS, and how the demands of the new element will impact the end users and their ability to accomplish their missions.

Classification:

313. Naval Aviation Mishap Severity Classes. The following mishap severity classes, based on an involved defined naval aircraft or UAV, personnel injury and property damage, apply to all three subcategories of mishaps listed below. Controlling custodians, in consultation and coordination with the NAVSAFECEN, shall ensure that mishaps are properly classified and that exceptions to mishap definitions are properly used. COMNAVSAFECEN is the final authority for mishap classification and the determination of mishap exceptions. To determine mishap costs see paragraph 316.

a. Class A Mishap. A class A mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is \$2 million or more, or a naval aircraft is destroyed or missing, or any fatality or permanent total disability of personnel results from the direct involvement of naval aircraft or UAV. A destroyed or missing UAV is not a class A unless the cost is \$2 million or more.

NOTE: The class A mishap definition typically excludes group 1, 2 and 3 UAS and UAVs unless the mishap cost total is \$2 million or more, or there is any fatality or permanent total disability of personnel.

b. Class B Mishap. A class B mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is \$500,000 or more, but less than \$2 million, or results in a permanent partial disability, or when three or more personnel are hospitalized for inpatient care (which, for mishap reporting purposes only, does not include just observation or diagnostic care) as a result of a single mishap.

c. Class C Mishap. A class C mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is \$50,000 or more, but less than \$500,000, or a nonfatal injury or illness that results in 1 or more days away from work, not including the day of the injury.

NOTE: See paragraph 206 for investigations involving injuries that are 1 or more day away from work up to and including 10 days away from work.

d. Class D Mishap. A class D mishap is one in which the total cost of damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is \$20,000 or more, but less than \$50,000; or a recordable injury (greater than first aid) or illness results not otherwise classified as a class A, B, or C mishap.

NOTE: Class D mishap reports are required but require less information than a class A, B or C report under relaxed WAMHRS

validation rules. Also, see paragraph 208 for reduced investigator requirements for class D mishap investigations.

314. Naval Aviation Mishap Subcategories

a. FM. A mishap where there is intent for flight and reportable damage to a DoD aircraft or UAV or the loss of a DoD manned aircraft. Explosives, chemical agent, or missile incidents that cause damage to an aircraft or UAV with intent for flight are categorized as FMs. Mishaps involving factory-new production aircraft until successful completion of the post-production flight are reported as contractor mishaps.

b. FRM. A mishap where there is intent for flight and no reportable damage to the aircraft or UAV itself, but the mishap involves a fatality, reportable injury, or reportable property damage. A missile that is launched from an aircraft or UAV departs without damaging the aircraft, and is subsequently involved in a mishap is reportable as a guided missile mishap.

c. AGM. A mishap where there is no intent for flight that results in reportable damage to an aircraft or UAV, or death or injury involving an aircraft or UAV. This applies to both on land and on board ship. Damage to an aircraft when it is being handled as a commodity or cargo is not reportable as an aircraft mishap.

IMPORTANCE OF PRIVILEGE:

EU Authorities Seek to Promote Air Safety

BRUSSELS, Belgium--The Delta Airlines Boeing 767 was cleared for takeoff and started rolling when the pilots spotted a 747 jumbo jet being towed across their runway. They hit the brakes and turned onto an adjacent taxiway.

The incident in 1998 at Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport caused only a brief departure delay for the Delta jet. Controllers reported the aborted takeoff later determined to have resulted from poor visibility and a misunderstanding of the position of the towing truck by a trainee controller and measures were taken to prevent any repeat.

But two years later, Dutch prosecutors brought criminal negligence charges against three controllers. Lengthy legal proceedings led to their eventual conviction, although no sentence was imposed and the controllers later returned to their jobs.

"The immediate result of that prosecution was that voluntary reporting of safety incidents in the Netherlands broke down overnight, and the number of reports dropped by 50 percent," said Fiona McFadden, a spokeswoman for the European Cockpit Association, a pilots' umbrella group.

Analysts say that the prompt identification of errors or hazards and potential or actual incidents are a fundamental element of air safety management. But recent surveys have revealed that in Europe and elsewhere, such incidents are increasingly going unreported because aviation professionals fear prosecution or punishment by management for their supposed mistakes.

Currently, automatic prosecution is standard practice in many parts of the world. This practice recently was highlighted in France, where two Americans and three French citizens were charged in connection with the 2000 Concorde crash.

In contrast, the United States already has in place a relatively successful Aviation Safety Reporting System. Established in 1975 by NASA, the system collects analyses and responds to voluntarily submitted but confidential aviation incident reports to reduce accidents and improve safety. The reporting rate is huge about 500,000 reports in 30 years because NASA databases have until now been protected against prying by legal authorities and employers.

But experts say the American model cannot be easily replicated in Europe or other countries with different judicial systems. They also point out that civil lawsuits following an

accident are far more common in America than in Europe because of differing legal systems.

In response, aviation groups including Eurocontrol, the continent's Brussels-based air navigation agency, and the European Cockpit Association have launched efforts to protect pilots, controllers, engineers and other operators. The European Commission the European Union's head office also is in the process of revising its directives on accident investigation to ensure that voluntary reporting of problems does not become tantamount to self-incrimination.

"The problem is determining the line between behavior that's not prosecutable like the controllers in Amsterdam where there was clearly no negligence and truly egregious behavior," said Sydney Drekker, a professor at Sweden's Lund Aviation University.

For example, if a pilot makes a hard landing he'll likely be reluctant to report it if he fears that he will be sanctioned. But this could cause damage to the landing gear or airframe, and might adversely affect safety conditions for the next crew flying that plane.

The International Civil Aviation Organization, the U.N. agency overseeing civil aviation, is now considering enforcing its recommending that prosecutions and punishments be restricted in order to encourage more open reporting.

ICAO will tackle the issue at a key conference in Montreal in October. A draft resolution emphasizes that investigations should not be used for purposes other than accident and incident prevention. It will also address the apparently conflicting goals of finding facts and finding faults in safety-related incidents.

Ahead of that meeting, Eurocontrol has taken the lead in formulating the new standards and defining a concept known as Just Culture a practice where operators are only punished for gross negligence or willful violations.

"Do we want to wait to learn only from disasters themselves, or do we want to learn from lower-level incidents reported to us by front-enders such as pilots, controllers or engineers," said Dragica Stankovic, a safety expert at Eurocontrol.

The goal should be to encourage a culture of transparency rather than cover-ups by allowing employees to freely report occurrences that happened to them or to their colleagues without fear of self-incrimination, Stankovic said.

Statistics on non-reporting of incidents are notoriously difficult to come by because of the reluctance of participants to volunteer such information.

But an anonymous survey conducted during a European aviation safety workshop in 2006 involving 130 representatives from national regulators, air traffic controllers' groups, pilots' organizations and investigators, found that that 36 percent of respondents feared legal sanctions resulting from national legislation. Another 31 percent were reluctant to report errors mainly due to concerns about the reaction of their company management.

Other factors cited included professional pride (12 percent), the complexity of the reporting system (3 percent), the lack of follow-up (8 percent), cultural reasons (6 percent), and even the fear of being exposed in the media (2 percent).

"Prosecutors and managers must balance factors for and against prosecution carefully and fairly. A prosecution is less likely to be needed if the offense was committed as a result of a genuine mistake or misunderstanding," said Antonio Licu, safety manager at Eurocontrol.

<http://callcenterinfo.tmcnet.com/news/2008/09/04/3634125.htm>

THE CONCEPT OF PRIVILEGE:

Military and federal courts grant protection under Executive Privilege to information given under promises of confidentiality, and to the analysis, conclusions and recommendations of the AMB and endorsers. Witness statements of those given a promise of confidentiality and deliberative analyses of the AMB are privileged. Any information which would not have been discovered but for information provided under a promise of confidentiality is also privileged. Information directly calculated by the AMB, or developed at the specific request of the AMB, is privileged when disclosing that information would reveal the AMB's deliberative process. Promises of confidentiality may be given by members of the AMB.

Privileged information shall not be used:

(a) In any determination affecting the interest of an individual making a statement under assurances of confidentiality.

(b) As evidence or to get evidence in making a misconduct or line-of-duty determination.

(c) As evidence to determine the susceptibility of personnel to discipline.

(d) As evidence in claims on behalf of the government.

(e) As evidence to determine the liability of the government for property damage caused by a mishap.

(f) As evidence before administrative bodies, such as Naval Aviator and Naval Flight Officer Evaluation Boards (FNAEB) or Field Flight Performance Boards (FFPB).

(g) As evidence before, or as any part of, a Judge Advocate General (JAG) Manual Investigation Report.

(h) In any other punitive or administrative action taken by the Department of the Navy.

(i) In any investigation or report other than aviation mishap safety investigations and aviation SIRs.

(j) As evidence in any court, civilian or military.

Privilege is sensitive information for official use only to those who have a "need to know" for safety purposes only..

The Purpose of Designating Information as Privileged.

Rationale. Privilege allows us to tell the truth, safe from fear of retribution. If privileged information was allowed to be used for purposes other than safety, vital safety information might be withheld. The actions above will:

(a) Overcome an individual's reluctance to reveal complete and candid information about the circumstances surrounding a mishap. Individuals may be reluctant to reveal information pertinent to a mishap because they believe that information could embarrass themselves, their fellow service members, their command, their employer, or others. They may also elect to withhold information by exercise of their constitutional right to avoid self-incrimination. Members of the armed forces must be assured that they may confide in others for the mutual benefit of fellow service members without incurring personal jeopardy in the process.

(b) Encourage AMBs and endorsers of aircraft SIR messages to provide complete, open and forthright information, opinions, and recommendations about a mishap. In one respect, the rationale for designating mishap investigative information as privileged is more important than the rationale for encouraging witnesses. AMB's and endorser's must feel free to develop information which could be vital for mishap prevention without fear that it could be used for other than safety purposes.

Protection of Privileged Information. To continue the revelation, development, and submission of privileged

information in aviation SIRs and endorsements, everyone in naval aviation must keep faith with the promises we make while gathering it. Repeated violations of this trust will destroy the credibility of the Naval Aviation Safety Program which has always depended for its success on its ability to protect privileged information.

WAMHRS

In October of 2010 the transition to a web based reporting system was implemented. The release of MISHAP and HAZARD reports was removed from message traffic and became web based. This required the development of a website dedicated to report input and format. Thus WAMHRS was born. WAMHRS is often confused with WESS (Web Enabled Safety System). WESS is the overall web based safety system used for various safety reporting, not just aviation. WAMHRS is a module within WESS and is used for 3750 reporting. The reports that are generated in WAMHRS are the following: HAZREPS, Safety Investigation Reports (SIR), Initial Notification (IN), Direct Enemy Action (DEA), and Endorsements.

OBTAINING A WAMHRS ACCOUNT

In order to gain access to WAMHRS you will first need an account. You get an account by requesting one through the Naval Safety Center Website. Select the WESS tab and follow the directions on how to obtain an account. Once you have an account you will be given certain permissions from your command's Safety Authority (SA) within WAMHRS. The permissions given to you by the SA will determine what reports you can generate and what information (e-mails) you receive from WAMHRS.

SAFETY AUTHORITY

The Safety Authority (SA) is designated in writing by the Commanding Officer to manage the permissions granted to command personnel regarding access to WAMHRS. There can be multiple SA in one command. To find out who the SAs are you must call or e-mail the Naval Safety Center and they will tell you who have been designated a SA for the command. To become a SA, go to the NSC website and select the WESS tab. This will take you to a page that has information on obtaining a WESS account and also the procedure for becoming a Safety Authority.

WAMHRS TRAINING

WAMHRS training is available on the SAS website. Select the Reporting tab and then select the WAMHRS Training Module. This will take you to a series of power point presentations on

using WAMHRS. You will also find the WAMHRS worksheets for data entry here.

WAMHRS HELP

WAMHRS is maintained and controlled by the Naval Safety Center. The point of contact for WAMHRS can be found on the first page of Approach Magazine under Analysts, WESS. Currently it is Leslee Duncan (757 444-3520 x-7245).

WAMHRS General Guidance

In general all reports should be done using a program outside of WAMHRS (usually Microsoft Word). Get all information and writing ready and then open WAMHRS and input the information.

There are two types of information that WAMHRS reports will require. The first is data. The second is written analysis.

The data that WAMHRS requires is simple to produce. Find the information and put it into the data field. A list of required data for WAMHRS can be found on the NSC website under the aviation tab, WESS / WAMHRS Aviation Training Module. Here you will see a variety of worksheets. These correspond to the various tabs in WAMHRS that will require data input. Print the worksheets that apply and fill them in. When you are ready to input into WAMHRS you will have all the data required.

The written analysis for the report is the more difficult to produce. Writing the report is best done in Word. The spell check in Word and all of the edit features in Word will give you a better ability to edit your report as you write it. When the report is complete you can copy and paste the text into the appropriate fields in WAMHRS.

**ALL CAPS IS NO LONGER REQUIRED FOR INPUT INTO WAMHRS;
THAT WAS FOR MESSAGE TRAFFIC, WHICH IS NO LONGER USED.**

WAMHRS REPORTS

Initial Notification (IN)

The purpose of an Initial Notification (IN) is to report that a **MISHAP** has occurred. This must be done in specific time frames depending on the severity of the MISHAP. For Class A and B the IN must be sent within 4 hours of the MISHAP (Class A also requires a phone call to the NSC within one hour). Class C must be sent within 24 hours. For Class D mishaps the IN is optional. The IN is not privileged and you must not allow privileged information to get into the IN or its updates.

IN are not typically done for HAZREPS, but are required for severe ATC HAZREPS.

In order to produce the IN you must be given privileges in WAMHRS by the Safety Authority of the command. A PowerPoint presentation is available on the SAS website to guide you through the process of inputting information into WAMHRS for an IN. The information required can also be printed out as a worksheet from the SAS website, filled in, and then entered into WAMHRS.

The IN should always be approved by the Commanding Officer or whomever he has authorized to approve IN. The IN is the commanding officer telling the fleet that he has had a MISHAP and that an Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) will be investigating and reporting the findings.

The IN can be updated anytime. This may be required for various reasons such as a change to the severity of the MISHAP (A to a B) or a request for more time to complete the report. In order to update the IN you must do it by using the update MDR function in WAMHRS.

Update MDR

(Change information on a submitted IN)

If the information in the original IN needs to be updated or a request needs to be submitted it will require an update to the IN. This is called an MDR update in WAMHRS. A PowerPoint presentation on how to do this is available on the SAS website under the Reporting tab. Select the WAMHRS training module and you will be taken to a list of power point presentations. Select the one labeled Update your MISHAP Data in your Initial Notification.

WARNING

Ensure there is no privilege information in the draft as it will be submitted with the updated IN!

HAZREP

When hazards occur but do not cause an aviation mishap, submit a Hazard Report via the Web-Enabled Aviation Mishap Hazard Reporting System (WAMHRS). WAMHRS is the primary means for Hazard Report submission. Where bandwidth limitations make WAMHRS submissions impossible, create the report using NSC created worksheets and forward the hazard report to the parent command or wing for entry submission.

A HAZREP will require much of the same work that a SIR will entail; however, there are no LOEs or rejected causal factors in a HAZREP. Data will need to be collected and input into WAMHRS and Analysis will need to be completed on the causes and recommendation. The best way to work on a HAZREP is to collect the Data required using the WAMHRS worksheets found on the SAS website and work in Word when writing the report (Refer to WAMHRS general guidance).

WARNING

There is no privilege in a HAZREP

SIR

Safety Investigation Reports are done in WAMHRS. The SIR and the HAZREP are very similar but the SIR requires more information and analysis. The SIR will need lines of evidence and rejected causal factors. These are not required in a HAZREP. The SIR will also contain privileged information and will require uploading all evidence for Endorsers access for review and comment. A PowerPoint presentation on how to do this is available on the SAS website under the Reporting tab. Select the WAMHRS training module and you will be taken to a list of power point presentation.

Endorsements

Endorsements are done in WAMHRS. This will require the endorser to have a WAMHRS account and the Safety Authority to grant endorsement privileges in WAMHRS. The endorser will review the SIR and endorse all rejected and accepted causal factor as well as all recommendations for an SIR. The endorser is also able to make comments at the end of the endorsement. The endorsement of a HAZREP is similar except there are no rejected causal factors to consider nor are there lines of evidence or uploaded evidence. HAZREP endorsements, like the HAZREP itself, are NOT privileged. A PowerPoint presentation on how to do this is available on the SAS website under the Reporting tab. Select the WAMHRS training module and you will be taken to a list of power point presentation.

Direct Enemy Action (DEA)

Direct Enemy Action reports are done in WAMHRS. These are done using the Initial Notification. Follow 3750 guidance regarding the requirements for the report but the IN is the format for reporting DEA. In the short narrative state DEA and write a short explanation of the incident.

After submitting the DEA WAMHRS will follow the same process it has for submitting an IN. This means that it will now begin a draft SIR for that IN. This will now sit in the commands WAMHRS account until the SIR is submitted. There is no SIR for a DEA. In order to clear the draft from the account you must contact the NSC WESS representative and explain that you will be submitting a DEA to clear it from your account. NSC will see it and allow it to clear WAMHRS. If you do not submit the SIR and allow the Draft to remain, the DEA will not make it to the WAMHRS data base. If you delete the IN for the DEA then the information will be lost even if you have submitted the IN.

SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT (SIR)

PURPOSE OF SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORTS:

SIRs report the hazards which cause mishaps and the damage or the injuries that occur during a mishap. Equally important is the opportunity they offer to submit recommendations to prevent the mishap and the damage or injury from happening again in the future.

DEADLINES:

Submit SIRs within 30 calendar days of the mishap. If aircraft or UAVs are missing, submit the report 30 calendar days after completion of the organized search. **Request extensions from the controlling custodian through WAMHRS MDR Update, if necessary.** Be sure to describe the specific reasons for your extension request; "administrative delay," or "investigative delay" are not enough. In some cases, combined calls for help and a deadline extension are appropriate. For example: when all the wreckage is not yet located, or when results of an EI, a pathological study, or a toxicology report have not yet been received. Include details on the status of any help requested in your extension request. The controlling custodian is instructed to respond via message, WAMHRS, email or other appropriate communication avenues.

ORIGINATOR:

The Senior Member and AMB write the SIR via WAMHRS and release the final SIR to create Fleet awareness, prevent recurrence, and submit to the endorsing chain for comment. **Do not distribute SIRs to individuals or commands not specified in the OPNAV 3750.6 (series) instruction under any circumstances.**

HOW TO WRITE AN SIR

GENERAL:

There are five major parts to writing a SIR; they are the data, narrative, lines of evidence (LOEs), causal factors, and recommendations. All information is entered into WAMHRS, which will format the report for you. It is recommended for the parts other than the data that you use Microsoft Word or other word processing software to write everything in and enter it into WAMHRS when your AMB is ready to submit the SIR. Below we will discuss each part of the SIR.

DATA:

All data is added to the report by simply filling in all fields in WAMHRS. To make data collection easier there are WAMHRS Worksheets on the SAS website under the Reporting tab and then selecting WAMHRS Training Module. Use the worksheets to gather the information and then take it with you to the computer when it is time to input the SIR (when you are getting ready to submit). To ensure you have filled in all fields, validate your report before submitting.

NARRATIVE:

The narrative is the story of what happened during the mishap. The narrative needs to tell important information that happened prior to the mishap, describe the mishap event in detail, and give a brief description of the search/recovery for the mishap and extent of injuries. Your investigation will reveal what the story is through the pertinent facts that you found led to the CFs. The narrative has to be written to be understood from the fleet nugget all the way through the Admirals or Generals that will endorse the report.

The narrative does not contain any analysis in it; save that for the causal factors. This means you do not answer why something occurred, do not interpret evidence, and do not discuss AMB deliberations. The narrative should be based on the facts that were discovered only. Key indicators that you are answering why are the use of phrases, such as "due to" or "because of." Indicators of interpretation are the use of words like "proper" or "inadequate" or the writing of what the AMB determined to be causal and not just the evidence that led to that determination.

LINES OF EVIDENCE (LOE) AND EVIDENCE:

Lines of Evidence are just that; one to two sentences that discuss a piece of evidence that has been used elsewhere in the report. LOEs are what you use to support your causal factors. If you do not use a LOE anywhere in the report, then it does not belong as a LOE in the SIR. An LOE should follow a simple format of stating the fact and citing the source. A (P) is required to be written in front of any LOE that comes from a Privileged source. An example of a LOE is below:

(P) Mishap pilot (MP) stated that he was trying to flip the wiper switch to the off position. (MP Interview)

Notice that the LOE is that MP stated ...; the fact or evidence is that MP stated something, not what MP stated. Also, notice the (P) in front of the LOE, indicating that this LOE comes from a privileged source.

Evidence used to support your LOEs must also be uploaded into WAMHRS. When uploading this evidence be sure to name the files that have privileged information in them with privilege in the name. It is also important to upload the Witness Statement forms, that you had individuals sign when you received interviews or statements, into WAMHRS with the statements themselves. This evidence will be available for the endorsers to review during the endorsement process and will be held in the Naval Safety Center (NSC) database for historical archives.

Causal Factors

The most difficult and most important aspect of the Safety Investigation Report (SIR) and a Hazard Report (HAZREP) is the identification and discussion of the causes of the Mishap or identifying the Hazards. During the investigation of a Hazard, Causal Factors are also identified and discussed but often times less effort is put forward because the causes of the Hazard did not result in a Mishap. The 3750 discusses the idea that Causal Factors and Hazards are the same thing. In Chapter one of the 3750 it states that "The word 'Hazard' may be used interchangeably with 'mishap causal factor'". In a HAZREP we identify a human or material factor that if not risk mitigated will lead to damage or injury. In the case of a Mishap, causal factors are the hazards that caused an unacceptable level of

damage and/or injury that must now be reported. For the purposes of this discussion we will use the term Causal Factor (CF) but as just discussed it is the same as saying the Hazard.

When trying to identify the causes of a mishap the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB) must first have investigated the incident and looked at the evidence. Interviews, aircraft examination, aircraft data, and expert interviews will enable the board to see the factors that ultimately led to the damage and/or injury of the aircraft or personnel. Taking that evidence and articulating the findings in the report is the most difficult part of the Safety Investigation. Once the AMB has investigated the mishap it is best to begin by brainstorming possible CF based on what the evidence has divulged. Let's begin with a mishap in which an aircraft has crash into the water. The first thing the board should do is investigate and find out as much about the incident as possible. Now the AMB must sit down together and start to come up with possible causes of the mishap by looking at the two types of CF, Human Factors and Material Factors. Material Factors tend to be the easier to develop because it is easy to take an aircraft part and see if it failed or if it did not fail. The board must look into the mishap and say what material factor could have caused this aircraft to get to where it is. What system failure could have or did fail and how did that cause the aircraft to end up in the water. In a Mishap investigation the board must consider all possible CF and accept or reject each one. This can be problematic because that can lead an AMB to go down paths that have nothing to do with the mishap but the AMB feels that it must rule it out. The best advice regarding what CF to examine is to say, "What would a reasonable person ask regarding the mishap?" If the aircraft ended up in the water a reasonable person would ask did the engines fail. A path that might not be reasonable, better known as a "rabbit hole", might be any possible way the engine could fail. If during the investigation you do find that the engine failed and it failed because of a specific failure of a component then the AMB would have to address the issue and explain what happened based on the evidence. If the AMB does not find that the engine failed then there is no reason to go down any other path to explain how the engine could have failed. Avoiding rabbit holes can be difficult but try to rule out the

larger factor and only go into the details if it is in fact a cause of the mishap.

Human Factors (HF) are the other type of factors that the board will have to brainstorm and develop. HF can be harder to develop because the AMB is discussing a person's decisions or performance and explaining why that person failed to perform or made an incorrect decision. An excellent tool to use when developing HF is the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System(HFACS) model. It can be used to help the board peel back the onion regarding HF. If you look at the HFACS model it begins with the act. The act is influenced by preconditions, the act and preconditions can be influenced by the supervisor and the supervisor, preconditions and act can be influenced by the organization. When you develop a HF the evidence will usually show you the act. If the pilot were to tell you in his interview that he looked at his HUD in flight and could not figure out which way was up and had to eject, then the board would write a HF of "Mishap Pilot failed to recover from an unusual attitude". The acts are usually very easy to find but you must not stop there. Using the HFACS model the preconditions to the act might be their own CF. In this case the pilot was Spatially Disoriented, but why? Was the pilot fatigued? Was the pilot not physiologically fit for flight? These could also be causes of why the aircraft is in the water. Remember though, HFs must be in the "Who did what?" format. An example would be "MP failed to attain adequate rest" or "MP violated 3710 crew rest requirements." Now the AMB must also look up the HFACS model. What was the role of the supervisor in the act? Did the CO schedule the pilot too aggressively? Did the CO not mitigate the risk of the event properly? Did the CO put out an unsafe policy? These could be possible causes to the Spatial D. Finally we must look at the Organization. Did any of the decisions of the organization influence or affect the supervisor, preconditions or act. Did the organization cut flight hours? Did the organization reduce aircraft availability? This could be a cause of the Spatial D. As the AMB looks at the HF it must again avoid the rabbit holes and stick to what the evidence has divulged. There is no requirement to have a CF at every level, but the AMB must at

least ask the question of what preconditions, supervisory, and organizational factors existed.

Now that the AMB has developed the CF based on the evidence it has found it must now write the CF and use the evidence to either accept or reject the factor. Human Factors are written in the format "WHO did WHAT" and material factors are written in the format "COMPONENT and MODE". An example of a HF would be "Mishap Pilot failed to recover from an unusual attitude." An example of a material factor would be "Engine Failed" or "Right Engine 5th stage compressor failed". When writing material factors try to be specific regarding the component if it was causal and use structural engineering failure modes to explain how it broke. Now that the AMB has written the CF it is time to take the evidence and support a rejection or an acceptance of the CF. It is very important that the AMB not speculate. The board takes the evidence and concludes or determines if the CF is accepted or rejected. Do not use phrases like "The AMB believes" or "The AMB feels". Use the terms "The AMB concludes" or "The AMB determined" in support of the CF. When using those terms it will drive the AMB to use facts to support the argument of acceptance or rejection of a CF. The fact that the board will use come from the evidence directly. In the case of the CF "MP failed to recover from an unusual attitude" the AMB would look at the aircraft data to see how the pilot operated the aircraft. They would also interview the MP and use his/her statement as evidence. The AMB would also want to define Spatial Disorientation and then show how the pilot meets that definition. After the board has presented the evidence to the audience then they will need to accept or reject the CF based on the findings.

Causal Factors are the essence of the Safety Investigation Report and the HAZREP. If the AMB does not investigate all of the causes then the potential for the mishap to reoccur is more likely. The investigation will show the board the causes of the mishap. The AMB must then take that information and present it to the fleet in the format provided in the 3750. The AMB is not to speculate it is to present the facts and conclude and determine the causes of the mishap or hazard.

Recommendations

Recommendations are an extremely important aspect of the Safety Investigation Report (SIR) and the Hazard report (HAZREP). Now that the AMB has identified the causes of the Mishap or Hazard they must tell the audience (The Fleet) what the AMB thinks should be done about it. The recommendations often times require an investigation on how a process for change occurs and how best to mitigate the risk of the CF. The AMB is tasked to give recommendations because they are the most familiar with the situation and can give the best insight into how to mitigate the risk most effectively. The AMB must have a recommendation for every accepted CF. Rejected CFs do not need recommendations as the board has determined that the CFs did not cause the Mishap. The AMB **does not** have to have an individual recommendation for each CF; one recommendation could cover ten accepted CFs. It is important that the board not use language that is ambiguous. Terms like "review", "research", "investigate" are so broad and can be interpreted in so many ways that nothing is really going to get done to mitigate the risk. The AMB must be specific in its recommendations and assign recommendations to the right agency. For example, tell Mishap Squadron that it needs to change the SOP and specific guidance needs to be in the SOP on aircraft and vegetation strikes and reporting procedures if an incident occurs. Do not put a recommendation that the Mishap CO review the SOP. The AMB can recommend anything it wants and should not worry about cost. It should also consider if the cause that the recommendation is for is a Navy/Marine Corps wide issue and if that is the case how does the organizational level mitigate the risk. It is essential to the SIR and the HAZREP that the AMB give a strong effort to recommendations. The AMB knows the causes of the mishap or hazard and now must tell the fleet how to mitigate the risk to reduce the likelihood of reoccurrence.

HAZREP REPORTING

****Every individual in Naval Aviation has an obligation to report hazards. ****

A hazard is a potential cause of damage or injury that is under human control. The goal of the Naval Aviation Safety Program is to identify and eliminate hazards before they result in mishaps.

PURPOSE OF HAZARD REPORTS:

1. To report a hazard and the remedial action taken, so others may take similar action.
2. To report a hazard and recommend corrective action to others.
3. To report a hazard so another organization may determine and take appropriate corrective action.
4. To document a continuing hazard in order to establish risk severity and exposure.

The following subparagraphs explain how to detect and report hazards before a mishap occurs.

Hazard Detection before a Mishap. Analyzing and observing near-mishaps and incidents, conducting safety surveys, and reviewing command plans, policies, procedures and instructions will aid in detecting hazards before a mishap occurs. Risk management, applied in the planning stages of an operation, will identify hazards at the earliest possible opportunity. Individuals or commands with direct, first-hand knowledge of the circumstances surrounding a hazard are the most effective at detecting and reporting hazards. An essential element of an effective Command Safety Program, risk management includes a review of operating procedures, analysis of equipment failures, etc., for hazard detection and assessment. Two vital parts of hazard assessment are: classifying the hazard according to the severity of the expected damage, and determining the probability, or likelihood, that the identified hazard will occur.

Hazard Reporting. Everyone associated with Naval Aviation has an obligation to report hazards. It is essential that Commanding Officers encourage and command safety programs foster hazard reporting. Once identified, the attendant risk should be

assessed both for mishap probability and severity. Hazards that threaten people or organizations outside the command must be reported to higher authority. Reports may include descriptions of corrective action (risk control options) undertaken by the command, which would benefit other commands facing similar problems.

Prevention of Damage and Injury. Eliminating the hazards which cause them will eliminate mishaps. It's when we fail in this effort that mishaps occur. As a reminder, ***The goal of the Naval Aviation Safety Program is to eliminate or control hazards.***

COMMON SIR MISTAKES

SAS recommends using Ariel Font, lower case and a good spell checker for all WAMHRS products

1. Fill in all required fields - **Validate your report in WAHMRS!**
2. Did you define all T/M/S specific terms for non-aviator endorsers who will need to understand the message?
 - a. Abbreviations: the convention with Naval Messages is to **spell out an abbreviation the first time it is used in the context of a message**, with abbreviations used after that. Ex. - Web-Enabled Safety System (WESS)
 - b. Don't assume model-specific abbreviations are going to be commonly used outside your unit - you have an endorsing chain, likely that includes non-aviators or aviators from other type-model-series that will need to be able to readily understand the SIR text.
3. Lines of evidence:
 - a. Facts partially obtained from privileged sources make those lines of evidence privileged. Are they labeled as such w/ "(P)" before line of evidence?
 - b. Do all lines of evidence cite the source of the information they contain? (i.e. "MP stated ...", "EI indicated..." etc.) Put source in parenthesis at end of LOE.
 - c. AMB calculations done during the investigation will be privileged lines of evidence.
 - d. Lines of evidence should be in an order, either chronologically or by causal factor. (Or something sensible to the reader).
 - e. Don't forget when uploading evidence to include Witness Statement Forms.
4. Aeromedical/Injury:
 - a. Reserved for the Flight Surgeon.
 - b. Aeromedical Analysis goes here.
5. Factors:
 - a. **EVERY LINE IN AN ANALYSIS PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE BACKED UP BY A LINE OF EVIDENCE**, unless discussing AMB deliberations. AMB deliberations belong here.
 - b. All accepted causal factors
 - i. Should be organized in either chronological order or an order sensible to the reader. (Should build on one another as the report progresses).
 - ii. Need to show it is true **AND** causal **AND** tell readers why it happened.

- iii. Shall have only 1 Act or Supervision or Organizational Influence as starting point for Human Factors tier entry. (one "WHO" did "WHAT")
- iv. Shall have 1 COMPONENT, 1 MODE, (multiple AGENTS if applicable)
 - 1. COMPONENT will not show up in WAMHRS report.

6. Recommendations

- a. Be SPECIFIC with recommendations on WHO (Agent) will fix precisely WHAT you want done.
- b. Your squadron should be the Agent for Publication changes and YOU should submit the change to say exactly what you want.
- c. Include your squadron for recommendations. This shows command involvement on aspects you can influence at your level. Either you do it or risk having your endorser's direct action for you.
- d. Do your recommendations consider implications of your causal factors outside your community? (Training pipeline, NAVAIR, maintenance documentation)
- e. Not sure how to word a recommendation? Call the Safety Officer for the command with action assigned and have them help word the recommendations.

7. HFACS

- a. Need an INDIVIDUAL and ACT combination for an Operator
- b. Make sure you explain the WHY in your causal factor analysis. This will be what you base your nano-codes on.
- c. Need to list all HFACS as they apply: ACT PRECONDITION, SUPERVISION, and ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCE - leave blank in WAMHRS if none.
- d. If CRM is the causal factor then more than one individual can be cited in the casual factor statement.
- e. Don't "double tap" nano-codes for same "who did what."
- f. If multiple nano-codes make sense for a pre-condition, supervisory, or organizational influence pick the best one for that "why." If there are multiple "whys" then you can have multiple nano-codes.

AMB SENIOR MEMBER'S GOUGE

(Updated by SAS Staff)

1. Divide, Conquer and Delegate.
2. Assign tasks based upon AMB members' skill levels
3. Assign due dates to complete tasks
4. Identify all possible Causal Factors from the evidence. Then assign to board members to investigate further.
5. Write Causal Factor Statements in proper format.
 - A. WHO did WHAT or
 - B. COMPONENT broke in MODE
6. Arrange Causal Factors of the Mishap in a Domino Chain Format, Chronologically, or by Functional area format.
7. Write your Causal Factor paragraphs
 - A. For Accepted Factors - Prove the statement is true, that it was causal to the mishap and tell the reader WHY it happened.
 - B. For Rejected Factors - Prove the statement is not true OR that it is true, but not causal to the mishap.

(Note: WAMHRS .pdf output will group rejected causal factors together and list them before the accepted causal factors)
8. Review your lines of evidence ensuring that you used ALL lines of evidence within your causal factor paragraphs.
10. Ensure you have uploaded all evidence, used in creating lines of evidence, into WAMHRS.
11. Check for (P) in front of all privileged lines of evidence. Check for proper wording. MP Stated. Document revealed.
12. NARRATIVE - Ensure the narrative tells the entire story, but does NOT contain any analysis or interpretation of the facts.
13. Develop your Recommendations to fix each Accepted Causal Factor
 - a. 3 layer fix: Fix it for your squadron, the community, and for the fleet.
14. Review your Recommendations to ensure you fixed each and every Mishap Causal Factor and Causal Factors of Other Damage and Injury. Be sure to think of how you can fix the problem now and for the future.

5 THINGS I WISH I'D ASKED MYSELF BEFORE I MET MY BOARD
(A SENIOR MEMBER RECALLS)

1. Am I the Outsider? Chances are, yes, and this is hugely significant. First of all, you'll most likely be appointed several hours (or perhaps a few days) after the fact, and in effect stepping onto a moving train. **Your AMB may already have met and begun establishing its own dynamics (and tensions). Furthermore, the AMB will most likely be made up solely from the mishap command's members, and your outsider's perspective may be at odds with their shared accepted norms and cultural preconceptions.** Issues that raise the hairs on the back of your neck may seem less significant to them. The mishap crew, alive or deceased, will be their friends—they may find it **difficult to dispassionately examine mistakes** that were made. Given alternatives, they will find causal factors that deflect 'blame' away from their culture to be highly attractive. Your task, and your struggle, may be keeping your own AMB intellectually honest. Which leads to . . .

2. How will we organize? The list of initial tasks is a good start for each member's "to do" list, but only for the first few days—then it gets busy as your investigation takes you into a variety of areas. **New tasks—overt and implied, critical and administrative, will arise continuously, and the board will have to delegate amongst themselves to keep up with the work product.** Travel may or may not be involved. **Will you full-time sequester your members off the flight schedule, and/or away from their normal jobs?** If so, for how long? There may be tremendous pressure not to sequester, especially as the AMB drags on—but you risk inertia if they're not kept on task. If you allow members the autonomy to coordinate schedules, when will you meet? What decisions require the full participation of the members? What are your operating rules? And specifically, . . .

3. Is this a dictatorship, or a democracy? One of the first things I told my AMB was "we will reach **consensus** on our causal factors" — words I would come to regret on more than one occasion when I was the sole member pressing for a causal factor against the quasi-opposition of the remainder of the board. We spent long hours **grinding out the central issues of the mishap: debating the evidence**, stating (and restating) our positions, arguing over the semantics of seemingly insignificant phraseology. That said, I considered the opposite model unworkable: even if I were inclined to direct the opinions and findings of the board, I believe I would have soon faced a mutiny by the AMB members, all of whom had strong and heartfelt opinions of their own and were making a conscientious effort to get the findings right. It's not always easy, but I think it's

essential to hammer it out, with the best ideas rising out of the pig-pile. Your leadership and integrity will be the key—and don't hesitate to call out the contrarians, behind closed doors if necessary, and get them back on the path. Your input should equal at least 51 percent of the vote. - **This is not true!**

3750.6 states that the Senior Member SHALL lead by consensus (SAS)— It is, after all, your name and reputation on the SIR. So it's important to ask . . .

4. Do we have a Naval Safety Center Rep helping us? To my credit, I did ask this question. The mishap command, however, was strongly opposed—for their own reasons—to inviting the NSC to send an advisor, and I acquiesced. **It was my single biggest mistake**, so don't repeat it. Naval Safety Center assistance, which I belatedly petitioned for and received, was the single greatest asset we had at our disposal. Their experience and expertise were key to us finding our way out of the woods, and would have made a critical difference in the first 96 hrs of the board convening. If the command should, for whatever reason, be opposed to involving the Safety Center remember that your requirements beat their desires. The Navy Safety Center representative, if nothing else, should be the Senior Member's consigliere (see question 1 above, again), and should keep you asking the central question . . .

5. Am I seeing the big picture? By its nature, an AMB digs deep into the mechanics of a mishap, and in practice some debates over causal factors become painfully convoluted and esoteric. That's OK, because it's all an effort to be as accurate as possible in describing what happened. But it's also true that, writ large, mishaps often play out like classic tragedies: **some causes are contributive, some are foundational, and together they tell the full story. Beware of becoming overly fascinated with a valid, compelling (but overall less significant) causal factor at the expense of the fundamental truth.**

AMB TRAINING LESSONS LEARNED (from AMB member)

(Updated by SAS Staff)

1. Train all AMB members prior to a mishap.

While Undra and L-eye knew the procedures being ASO trained, I had to learn on the job which was not ideal. While the AMB senior member is supposed to train the AMB, this is not reasonable due to the real time selection process. Recommend having the ASO train all standing AMB members. I know this can be painful but I think it would definitely help. It could be as little as "You are a possible AMB member, read the 3750..." -

Should have quarterly training in place for AMB -

2. Try to prevent yourself from jumping on the "jump to conclusions mat".

I found myself during the course of the evidence gathering phase trying to find evidence to prove my theories for the mishap.

While some of this is unavoidable, all AMB members need to realize how easy it becomes.

3. Our pre-mishap kit (CSFWP) was insufficient.

The cameras need to be upgraded at the minimum every couple of years. Especially one with enough mega pixels so you can blow up pictures to find small details (serial numbers). The tape recorders were old, unreliable and close to useless. The wing or squadron needs to invest in at least 3 digital and analog voice recorders. Every AMB member needs a separate GPS unit. It was too difficult trying to find the guy with the GPS on the other side of the ridge. This will enable all members to take fixes off critical parts especially when they are spread out over wide area.

4. Since most fleet imaging sites are disappearing the pre-mishap AMB needs to coordinate a photographer to be available in the chance a mishap occurs. We were fortunate to have a NTSB trained photographer available. We lucked out. Needless to say his photos were remarkably better than our digital ones taken by the AMB members.

5. If we had no survivors how would we have done it.??

With the extreme temperatures (118 degrees) pulling parts off the mountain for E.I. would have been challenging to say the least. The pre mishap AMB should coordinate possible squadrons for helo support in the case of a mishap. Ideally this would be an H-60. The SAR Hueys barely sufficed for our needs.

6. Immediately after the mishap put in a request with the NSC for all SIRs relating to the current mishap.

It would provide some historical background on the type of mishap you are investigating (midair, gear up landing...). This way when you return from the crash site, you will not be waiting for info.

7. Be ready for everyone on base to ask you what happened.

This would usually be preceded with a "I know you cannot tell me what happened, but what happened?" We are worse than the wives club.

8. All aircrew need to keep their records at the squadron (NATOPS, SFWT jackets, logbooks).

Piecing together a logbook from a mishap crewmember who has not added in his yellowsheets for the past 6 months is a pain. Let the Ops YNs do their job. NATOPS needs to ensure that they have everyone's SFWT jacket. Tracking them down was very difficult, especially when you have a fatality.

9. Recommend having NAVAIR look into adding a GPS capability to the DFIRS.

The beacons were difficult to DR when you are in a mountainous region. The beacon seemed to bounce off the canyon walls making it very difficult to find. Compounding this was the fact that the surviving aircrew never turned off their seat beacons. If the DFIRS had a GPS capability like the PRC-112 maybe they would be easier to find. Aircrew need to be reminded to turn off their seat beacon prior to rescue if able.

10. The MIST/ALSS guys at China Lake were awesome.

A great resource close to home. Unbelievable what they can find out with limited aircraft parts.

11. Once appointed, squadron will do the initial notification/MDR and get the in squadron stuff done, board go direct to site.

12. Prior to departing need the following:

a. Equipment for terrain and area (good call by Jack getting camel packs, we should have had orange vests, radios for each person...)

b. Voice recorder that works, with enough memory/tapes, for all witness interviews, especially aircrew involved.

c. Digital camera for each party (we split into 4 teams at one point to cover more ground) video is cool, but tough to put into SIR package.

d. Point of contact to meet upon arrival (great job by NAS China Lake CO/XO and VX-31 hooking us up)

13. Once interviews begin and you are in a position to talk to key/critical witnesses, get complete specific facts. (Should have had aircrew draw the event, blank HUD pics with him drawing on them would have been great) models are good, but tough to refer back to.

14. Do all chopping in Word, don't even think about putting it into WAMHRS until the final chop is made.

15. Keep evidence that you think you will use in one place (one person), so copying, etc... is easy. This worked well.

16. Only use the pics you actually need to prove your point.

17. Don't talk too much about what happened during the evidence collection phase.

OK to note interesting findings for board members, but keep speculation to a minimum.

18. We did evidence collection, interviews, deliberation, decided on casuals, narrative, causal write-ups (about 2-4 each), evidence and then recommendations/ORM... worked pretty good, but the story has to be complete before you start writing the casuals or you re-write the causal each time you get pertinent information.

19. We did a lot in virtual world which actually helped keep us connected.

20. We bounced thoughts off safety center and safety school which helped immensely.

21. Specific TRAINING Prior. Sit down with the XO and all your primary and secondary AMB members and get their inputs for the following:

a) Open up your mishap kit and see what's good and what's not-- then make it better. (Generic mishap kit now available in supply system)

b) Print-out a recent good Class A FM and have everyone read it from cover to cover. Discussing the entire format, what's expected, how to get the info, HFACS, recommendations, guidance, and ask for feedback/questions.

c) Develop a class A FM in the mountains of WA scenario; and recall XO and all your primary and secondary AMB members to the ready room to discuss, murder board, "chalk talk" what the AMB needs to do. Reference your PMP and OPNAV 3750 pocket checklist, and just write down on the grease board what you need to do.

d) Go over the NSC OPNAV pocket 'gouge' checklist handed out at SAS.

e) When a HAZREP worthy situation arises have board members help in the investigation and interview process.

WAMHRS FAQ from NSC

1. Controlling Custodian sets endorsing chain
2. Account request
3. Upside down question marks
4. Downgrade
5. Data pull
6. EDIT A REPORT
7. ENDORSING CHAIN
8. UIC ACCOUNT CHANGE
9. E-MAIL ACCOUNT CHANGE
10. ACCOUNT REQUEST
11. NO Safety Authority
12. Endorsement for NAVAIR
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1. Controlling Custodian sets endorsing chain

Your Controlling Custodian sets the endorsing chain, but they do not know the cause factors and recommendations before you release the report (and they shouldn't), only put in the first endorser (CO) when you release the report. Once it is released, your Controlling Custodian will have the chance to read the SIR and determine the endorsing chain. They will then send it to you, CCing me, and you can put it in during the CO's endorsement. The rest of the chain must be in before you release the CO's endorsement or it won't go through the entire process.

2. Account request

Since the Controlling Custodian does not know the cause factors before you release the report (and they shouldn't), only put in the first endorser (CO) when you release the report. Once it is released, CNAP will have the chance to read the SIR and determine the endorsing chain. They will then send it to you, CCing me, and you can put it in during the CO's endorsement. The rest of the chain must be in before you release the CO's endorsement or it won't go through the entire process.

3. Upside down question marks

For the upside-down question marks, there must be a space between the apostrophe or quotation mark to fool Microsoft programming. Put a space before an apostrophe (Andrew(space)'s, don(space)'t, etc). For quotation marks you will put "(space)type you sentence.(space)"

4. Downgrade

When you sent the Initial Notification, the system auto-created the draft SIR in your account. Open that report. Go to the General Information screen and change it from a MISHAP to a HAZARD and change the severity from C to H. Go to the top middle of the screen and select Update MDR>TRANSMIT UPDATED MDR (you can also view the PDF there first before selecting the transmit option). When the justification box comes up, type in "No longer meets the criteria of a class C mishap; downgrade to a hazard".

5. Data pull

Go into your WESS account, in the START MENU and select PREFORMATTED REPORTS. When it loads up, click VIEW REPORTS. The next page will have all the canned reports we have. You can scroll through to see the many reports or you can put a word in the top search block. If you want all versions of a type of aircraft then type the word BASIC in the search box and you will get all Series of that aircraft. If you want the specific series then type in SPECIFIC. If you want to do mishap and/or hazard by searching the narrative, then type in NARRATIVE in the search box. If you want to search by reporting UIC type in UIC. When you select a report you will have to fill in the parameters (date range/type/etc) you want and then hit OK.

The data will come back on multiple pages. When it comes back it is much easier to go to the top right of the screen and select the icon to make a PDF of the data. Then you can scroll through the reports. Save the PDF you generate of the data on your desktop.

As you look through the data, if it is a hazard report, the WESS serial number is a hyperlink to the full hazrep. Even if you are logged out of WESS, those hyperlinks still work so that's why I say save it on your desktop. The mishap search will not give you hyperlinks to the full report. You will have to send me the WESS serial numbers for those.

6. EDIT A REPORT

To pull a report back for edit, go into the START menu in the lower left of your screen. Select SEARCH/EDIT SUBMITTED REPORTS. When the screen loads up, search for you command in the REPORTING UIC field (or just put the WESS serial number in the EVENT SERIAL NUMBER block if you have the specific number). Click SEARCH. (Sometimes you have to click it twice). Your report/s will load up below. To just view the PDF, click the VIEW button. To pull the report back for edit click the EDIT button. This will pull the event out of our database and back into the EDIT SUBMITTED folder for each person who was an authorized drafter in the original report. The report will have to be re-released after the edits are made.

7. ENDORSING CHAIN

NSC does not assign the endorsing chain. You need to contact your controlling custodian and have them tell you the endorsing chain. You must input the full chain before you release the CO's endorsement. You have the same entry screens to put in the endorsing chain during the endorsement process as you do when filling out the SIR.

8. UIC ACCOUNT CHANGE

You have to go into your account and change the UIC. Go into the START menu and select ACCOUNT MAINTENANCE>MODIFY ACCOUNT. When your information loads, make the changes and hit SAVE. The request will go to the Safety Authority of your new command to approve your account transfer into your new command.

9. E-MAIL ACCOUNT CHANGE

You need to go into your account and change the e-mail address. Go into the START menu and select ACCOUNT MAINTENANCE>MODIFY ACCOUNT. When your information loads, make the e-mail change and hit SAVE. The system will then send you an auto-generated e-mail which you must click the link in to verify your new .mil. Then you should be good to go.

10. ACCOUNT REQUEST

To request an account, go to <https://wess.safetycenter.navy.mil> Fill out the required information and click SAVE. The system will send an auto-generated e-mail which they must click the link in to verify their .mil e-mail address. The account request will then go to the command Safety Authority for assignment of permissions. After that, it will come here for final approval.

11. NO Safety Authority

This what we send out if someone requests an account but the command does not have a Safety Authority, "I approved your WESS/WAMHRS account with only the minimum permissions in your account because you command does not have a Safety Authority on file. A Safety Authority is a person within the command, designated by the Commanding Officer, who manages the WESS accounts and defines what level of access people at the command are allowed to have. Procedures for designating a Safety Authority can be found on the WESS page of the Naval Safety Center website."

12. Endorsement for NAVAIR

The hazrep must be endorsed through your controlling custodian (CNAL/CNAP) when it is a RAC 1/2 and it has a recommendation for NAVAIR. Plus you need to change the NAVAIR UIC to N00019, the main NAVAIR UIC. Otherwise you will not get any action taken on this.

13. ENDORSEMENT PROCESS FOR ENDORSERS

ENDORSEMENT PROCESS FOR ENDORSERS

There are some glitches in the system when you do an endorsement that I want to walk you through before you click anything. I can warn you ahead of time but I cannot fix them after the fact. Here is the endorsement process in WAMHRS:

After we QA the report The endorsement process starts. It goes to the first endorser, but since you are in the endorsing chain, you will get an e-mail letting you know the process has started. When the reports comes to you for endorsement, you will get a specific one telling you it is to your command for endorsement and you have 7 days to complete it. You will open the report from your endorsement folder, go to the top middle of the screen and select VIEW PDF. There will be two selections, one for the SIR PDF and one for the endorsement PDF. You can open both of those so you can read what the mishap board said and what the previous endorser said.

There is an issue in the PDF where it is pulling off of existing data when you click on the link from the previous endorsement e-mails that have went out. If you have already entered draft information in your endorsement and someone clicks on the link in an e-mail from a previous endorser, the system will populate your draft data into the PDF for others to see before you release it. My recommendation is to draft up your endorsement in a Word Document in the format of the endorsement PDF. When an endorsement comes to me, I generate the PDF, copy and paste it into a word document and then put my draft endorsement in there for review up the chain of command. Once the final is approved, I copy and paste it into WAMHRS and release it.

There are four tabs at the top of the right window; 1- the tab that you see when you open the report, 2-factors, 3-recommendations, and 4-comments. You will go to the factors tab, click on each factor, read through it then scroll down to see the available selections. You will select CONCUR or DO NOT CONCUR in the dropdown for each factor. The you will go to the recommendations tab and do the same. DO NOT SELECT RESTATE!! That is the one error I really cannot fix. If you wish to RESTATE a factor or recommendation, then either CONCUR with it, but put you restate comments in the justification box below the CONCUR (CONCUR; however restate factor to read....."). If it is a major restate you can DO NOT CONCUR with that factor/recommendation and then add a new one the way you want it to read. Then enter the Commander's comments on the comments tab. You will put them in the top box and click the ADD COMMENTS button in the middle of the screen to move them to the lower highlighted area. Hit SAVE. Generate the endorsement PDF to ensure they are showing. Sometimes it takes a minute or two for the comments to show up. Ensure you have entered the full endorsing chain before you release the endorsement.

To release the endorsement, go to ENDORSEMENT ACTIONS>ENDORSE REPORT. When the justification box comes up, type in NONE and the OK. This will release your report and send it to the next endorser

14. EXTENSION REQUEST

When you sent the Initial Notification, the system auto-created the draft SIR in your account. Open that report. Go to the top middle of the screen and select Update MDR>TRANSMIT UPDATED MDR (you can also view the PDF there first before selecting the transmit option). When the justification box comes up, type in "Request a ?? day extension; (reason), or "request extension, awaiting EI". Hit OK. This will transmit out your Updated MDR and what you typed in the justification box will be imported into the body of the e-mail.

Your Controlling Custodian will get the e-mail and then e-mail you back, CC'ing me, approving/disapproving your extension.

15. Location on aircraft error.

Change the Factor to a MATERIAL FACTOR>FALIURE/ MALFUNCTION OF AIRCRAFT SYSTEM. Go down and answer the Location on Aircraft to 1st position. Then go back up and change you factor back to SPECIAL. It will clear out the error.

16. Class D

Go here to look at the DD 6055.07

<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/605507p.pdf>

Page 10, paragraph g says: g. Establish procedures for collecting data on fire losses, and use the information to identify mishaps for losses exceeding the Class D cost threshold.

Page 15: Investigate, record, and report all Class A, B, and C mishaps and work-related Class D mishaps. DoD Component safety investigation directives shall specify procedures for the collection and analysis of all other events not meeting the DoD thresholds. Collect, as a minimum, the mishap data requirements specified at <https://www.denix.osd.mil/portal/page/portal/SHF/References>.

Graphic on page 36

Investigation requirements, page 40.

Definition, page 46: Class D mishap. The resulting total cost of property damage is \$20,000 or more, but less than \$50,000; or a recordable injury or illness not otherwise classified as a Class A, B, or C mishap.

This is for all DOD components, effective date June 6,2011. We have been storing those events in the database as Class D's, but do not have the option for squadrons to select it yet.

CLASS D INFO FOR USERS

Yes there is a requirement from DOD; however, we do not have the option to select a Class D in WAMHRS yet. Here is the definition:

Class D mishap. The resulting total cost of property damage is \$20,000 or more, but less than \$50,000; or a recordable injury or illness not otherwise classified as a Class A, B, or C mishap.

The Class D requirement is a requirement passed down from DOD in the DOD 6055. It is to collect statistical data on report between \$20,000 and \$49,999 or specific lesser injuries. If this incident had happened prior to the new 3750.6S, you would be filing a hazrep. The Class D is just a hazrep

under another name because it hit a dollar amount less than a Class C, but within the dollar amount DOD wants to collect in the data we provide to them.

For a Class D, you do not have to convene an AMB. It will be the same as filing a hazrep, but with a different name. It will not require an Aeromedical analysis, AMB, and other things unique to a Class A, B, C mishap. There will be no Initial Notification and you will have 30 days to complete the report. However, if the Commanding Officer wants to convene a full board and use privileged information, he can do so.

If you want to file it as a Class D with privileged information, select mishap severity C so you will enter the mishap format and be able to add Evidence, Lines of Evidence, REJECTED cause factors and AA if needed. At the beginning of the narrative field type in: MISHAP IS ACTUALLY A CLASS D, BUT FILED AS A CLASS C TO USE WAMHRS SIR FORMATTING. WAMHRS DOES NOT HAVE CLASS D AVAILABLE YET. WHEN AVAILABLE, NAVAL SAFETY CENTER WILL CHANGE SEVERITY IN DATABASE.

If there is no granting of privilege and no AMB convened, keep filing them as hazreps. When a hazrep comes in falling into the Class D criteria, we store it in the database as a Class D.

At the beginning of the narrative field type in: REPORT IS ACTUALLY A CLASS D, BUT FILED AS A HAZREP. WAMHRS DOES NOT HAVE CLASS D AVAILABLE YET. WHEN AVAILABLE, NAVAL SAFETY CENTER WILL CHANGE SEVERITY AND FORMATTING IN DATABASE.

17. SHIP UNDERWAY STATUS MUST BE NA ERROR

Go to the OTHER page. Change ship involved to YES. Scroll down and put the ship underway? To NA. Then change it back to ship involved NO. It will clear out your error.

18. Outlook Rules

The Community of Interest notification are based off of what UIC you are in, not individual accounts.

However rules can be written in outlook so they do not clobber up the inbox. In Outlook, go to Tools>Rules and Alerts. Step one gives options of who the messages will apply to. Step two; pick, "Apply this rule after message arrives from (people or distribution list) and move to (folder).

Two examples:

(P)

1. Write a rule that any message that arrives from WESSAdmin is moved into a special folder created in a PST, so the messages will not fill up the inbox. Then they can be reviewed at your convenience.

2. Write a rule that any message that arrives with the word BASH in the subject line to your delete folder. Be careful with this one if you are looking for a mishap level BASH report. It will also get deleted.

19. Hazard endorsement requirements

All Severe (RAC 1 or 2) hazard reports have to be endorsed. How high the endorsement goes depends on the recommendations. If it is a "Brief all" or something else that can be closed out at the CO level, the squadron can just put themselves in the endorsing chain. When the report comes to them for endorsement, since it is a hazrep, the system will automatically CONCUR with all and import in the CO's comments. Then they just release it.

If it has recommendation for outside the command, or if higher wants to endorse it, then the squadron does not put themselves in the chain; they will put what their Controlling Custodian says the chain should be.

20. Upside down question marks

To get rid of the upside question marks put spaces around the punctuation. Example: "(space) type the sentence(space)'s sentence.(space)" It will not show extra spaces in the PDF but will stop Microsoft programming from giving your upside down question marks.

21. Lines of Evidence

Once you put the lines of evidence in you cannot move the order around. You can edit the text, but not the order. I usually recommend that you just type up the LOE in a Word document and put them in at the very last before you send out the SIR. Sometimes Senior Members like to change them around at the last minute and then you have to delete out all the lines up to where the changes are made.

Make sure you put the (P) at the beginning of all privileged Lines of Evidence and in the title of each piece of privileged evidence. You will plain language name the evidence ((P) MAC Statement) so the endorsers can look for specific pieces quicker. You can upload the evidence at any time you want. You do not have to link the evidence to the line; the endorsing chain can download the evidence into one file without having to go through it line by line.

22. ROUTING CHAIN

Routing chain was built so you could route the report internal to the command, like from you to the CO for release. However, I HIGHLY recommend you do not use it. Once you route a report you lose all custody of it. If you want your CO to see it electronically, add him as an authorized drafter and it will put it in both yours and his SHARED folder.

23. QUICK/EASY WAY TO DO A HAZREP

At a minimum you need to fill out the following for a hazrep:

General Information

Aircraft

Involved Person - Only if it is a hazard with HUMAN FACTORS, PHYSEP or an injury. If it is only a Material Factor hazrep, you do not need the Involved Person.

Factors/Recommendations/CO's comments

Just fill out the first page of each section then hit validate. A lot of blue hyperlinks will come up, but most are YES, NO, NA, UNKNOWN. Click on the first link and it will take you to the page with the error and it will list the errors at the top of the screen. If the question =triggering the validation error is not applicable, you can select NA or UNKNOWN for check boxes and dropdowns, for numerical fields type in 0 and for text fields type in NA. Fill out only those questions. Now go to the bottom folder on the left and click in VALIDATE. That will take you right back to the page with the validation errors. Click on the next set of errors. Keep doing this until you clear out all errors. That is the quickest, easiest way to fill out a hazrep. If it is a BASH report, you do not need factors/recommendations/CO's comments.

24. ADDING PRIVILEGE INDICATOR AT BEGINNING OF LOE AFTER LOE ALREADY IN

Here is how you add the (P)'s after the lines are in there:

Copy and paste (P) - using CTRL C on your keyboard. Click on the Line of Evidence to move it back to the top input box, put your cursor at the beginning of the sentence and hit CTRL V to paste.

25. DOWNGRADE/UPGRADE FROM ONE MISHAP LEVEL TO ANOTHER MISHAP LEVEL

What you need to do to downgrade is open the draft SIR, go to the General Information screen and change the severity from B to C. Then go to the aircraft page and put in the new costing data. Click MDR Update and select TRANSMIT UPDATED MDR. When the justification box comes up, type in: No longer meets the criteria of a Class B mishap due to (??); downgraded to a Class C. When you hit OK, this will transmit your updated MDR to everyone who needs to know and will downgrade your mishap in our database. I would recommend, prior to transmitting your MDR, view the MDR PDF (in the same place as the TRANSMIT UPDATED MDR, to see what information is going to be sent out.

26. Clearing Validation Errors

If it is a numerical field, type in a zero.

If it is a text field, type in NA

All dropdowns and radio selection have NA or UNKNOWN

For the age/birthday question if you have an involved person put age 99, but you should not have to have an involved person in this type of report.

When you get the validation errors, click on the first one and it will take you to that page. Answer just those questions. Then go to the left column of folders and the bottom one says validation errors. Click into there and it will be the list of validation errors you had. Click on the next section and it will take you right to the next errors. That way you don't have to run the full validation each time.

27. SAFETY S EXTRA CREDIT

To run your reconciliation report, do the following:

Data pull

Go into your WESS account, in the START MENU and select PREFORMATTED REPORTS. When it loads up, click VIEW REPORTS. The next page will have all the canned reports we have. At the top of the list of reports you can put a word in the top search block. Type in "reconciliation" and hit the magnifying glass after the search box. When the report loads up, put in your full UIC (with the N before it for Navy) and what fiscal year you want.

The data will come back on multiple pages. When it comes back it is much easier to go to the top right of the screen and select the icon to make a PDF of the data. Then you can scroll through the reports. Save the PDF you generate of the data on your desktop.

For WESS access review you need to be the Safety Authority. If you are, go into ACCOUNT MAINTENANCE>MODIFY ACCOUNT in your start menu. Put your UIC in the top search box and a list of your command users will come up. Review each one to ensure they have the correct permissions and suspend any accounts of personnel who are no longer at your command or do not require access anymore.

28. SKIPPER CLOSE OUT RECOMMENDATIONS ONLY ENDORSER

All RAC 1 or 2 hazreps require an endorsement. Since the recommendations can be closed out by the skipper, only put your command in the chain. After you release the report and we QA it, it will come back to you for endorsement. We have programmed the system that if a hazrep is filed and the first endorser is the same as the reporting command, it will automatically CONCUR with all and import in the CO's comments from the hazrep. You just have to open the endorsement, click ENDORSEMENT ACTIONS>ENDORSE REPORT at the top of the screen. When the justification box comes up, type in NONE and hit OK. It will run a quick validation and then send the report to me for final processing.

29. MANAGING UICS AND PERMISSIONS FOR COMMANDS WITH MULTIPLE UICS

We are not authorized to remove UIC/RCC/MCC from the database. Our database is not just for Aviation, but all communities of the Navy, Marine Corps, Reservists, and other DOD components/services. Your squadron will have one UIC; however, personnel at your command could be assigned to a different RCC/MCC so if they are injured we need it available. Also, as another example, if an aircraft were carrying multiple passengers who fall into one of the categories above, when the mishap was reports you would have to include all their UIC/RCC/MCC in the Involved Person,

I sent an e-mail to Major Neas with what I think you should do. Whoever is your Safety Authority for accounts administration needs to be SA for all the UICs for your command. Once it is active, go through the other UICs you are SA for (not your main one, and remove aviation endorsement permissions from all account holders. If no one at those UICs have aviation endorsement permissions, then WESS will not allow those UICs to be selected to be added to the endorsement chain; they will only be able to select yours. Also, when anyone requests an account under those other UICs, the SA can ensure they are not given aviation endorsement permissions. Also, if someone in your aviation requests an account under the wrong UIC for you, you can reject the request back to them and make them apply under the correct UIC.

For anyone who is in your command who does need aviation permissions but are under the wrong UIC, here are the procedures for them to change their UIC over to the correct one:

30. MISREC/HAZREC

When a command is listed as an Action Agency on a mishap or hazard recommendation they must provide a response to the Naval Safety Center when action is COMPLETE, ACTION ONGOING, or DO NOT CONCUR (and why) any time after release of SIR/hazrep until 30 days after closed out of final endorser. If it is not closed out by then, the command must send us semiannual updates on when it will be complete.

Mishaps/hazards prior to Oct 2010 which were filed in message traffic had the MISREC/HAZRED responses come in Naval Message.

Now, with WAMHRS, they system provides you a way to respond. When the SIR/hazard is released, any recommendations which are for specific Action Agencies, the system will send it to that command's WAMHRS account in the MISREC/HAZREC folder. Each person at the command with a WAMHRS account and the Misrec/Hazrec permission will be able to see it. They will go in and give a misrec/hazrec response to that recommendation only. It is like doing an endorsement of a mishap/hazard, but only for the things you are actionable on.

31. SHARING FILES

. The Army has a website where you can transfer electronic files from one person to another. There is no size limit and any type of file can be downloaded. The website is <https://safe.amrdec.army.mil/safe/> Here is the

information on the system. Anyone DOD can use it. I use it a lot to get files from mishaps in Afghanistan this way.

AMRDEC SAFE Getting Started Guide

The AMRDEC SAFE application is used to send large files to individuals which would normally be too large to send via email. There are no users accounts for SAFE - authentication is handled via email and CAC. Everyone has access to SAFE, and the application is available for use by anyone.

Difference between CAC users and Guest users

There are only a few differences between sending SAFE packages as a CAC user and sending them as a guest:

- Guests are required to verify their email address after uploading each package;
- Guests cannot send packages to recipients that do not have a .mil or .gov email address;
- CAC users can add recipients in bulk using a semicolon-delimited list.

Sending Files

1.The AMRDEC SAFE application can be accessed via <https://safe.amrdec.army.mil/safe>.

2.There are two options to proceed from the SAFE homepage:

◦Proceed as CAC User - Select this option if you have a valid US DoD-issued CAC.

◦Proceed as Guest - Select this option if you do not have a CAC .

3.After selecting one of the options above, the page will be redirected to the package upload form. Fill in all the required input fields:

◦Your Name - Your name;

◦Your Email address - Your email address;

◦Confirm Your Email Address - Re-enter your email address;

◦Description of File(s) - Enter a description for the package;

◦File(s) - Click the "Browse" button to select your file(s). You may add up to 25 files per package, so long as the total file size does not exceed 2GB;

◦Deletion Date - Select a date for the package to be deleted from SAFE. The maximum (which is also the default) is two weeks (14 days) from today;

◦Provide an email address to give access to - Enter your recipient here and click "Add". CAC users may enter a semicolon-delimited list of emails in bulk so each recipient does not need to be added individually;

◦Grant access to these people - This is the list of people you have granted access to the package. To remove a recipient, highlight their name and click the "Remove" button;

◦Caveats - Default is "None";

◦Encrypt email message when possible - Attempt to encrypt the package's notification email to each recipient;

◦Notify me when files are downloaded - You (the sender) will receive a notification via email when a recipient downloads the package;

◦Require CAC for pickup - Require the recipient to be logged in with a valid US DoD-issued CAC to download the file(s). Recipients without a CAC will not be able to download the package.

4.Clicking the "Submit" button will upload the files and submit the package. Guest users will need to check their email to verify their email address before the recipients will be notified. No additional action is required by CAC users.

5.After the package has been uploaded (and verified, if proceeding as a guest), each recipient will receive a link to the package download page as well as a password. These passwords are unique for each recipient (not the package), and will be disabled once SAFE detects that the user successfully

downloaded each file within the package. Forwarding recipient and sender notification emails to anyone except the AMRDEC WEBTeam is strictly forbidden.

Receiving Files

Recipients will automatically be notified via email when they have been added as a recipient to a package. The email they receive will contain a link and a password. Clicking on the link will take the recipient to a page where they will be asked for the password. The best way to enter the password is to copy it from the email and then paste it into the password box.

After logging in, the recipient will be able to download all the files within the package. We recommend right-clicking on each file and selecting the "Save Target As" option to select the location to save the file to.

After downloading every file within the package, the recipient will not be able to log back in to download the files again. Simply logging in or starting a download will not lock the user out. In order to be locked out, the recipient must successfully download every file within the package.

Managing Packages

After uploading a package, the sender will receive a notification email with a link and a password. After accessing the link and entering the password, the sender will be able to manage their package:

- Adding Files - The sender can upload additional files to the package. Recipients will receive an additional notice email informing them that the package has been updated. Recipients who have already downloaded the package will be allowed back in to get the additional files.
- Adding Recipients - The sender can grant access to additional recipients to the package.
- Resending Recipient Notifications - If a recipient lost or never received their notification to pickup the files, the notification can be resent.
- Checking Recipient Status - The list at the bottom of the status page will show each recipient and whether or not they have downloaded the package. A download status of "False" means that they have not downloaded the package, whereas a download status of "True" means that they have. This feature is available regardless of whether or not the sender selected the "Notify me" on the upload page.

32. SEARCH EDIT SUBMITTED

Go into your START menu and select SEARCH/EDIT SUBMITTED REPORTS. Put your command name in the REPROTED BY field and select it when it pops up. Then hit SEARCH (sometimes you have to hit it twice). Your report will load up below with two options; VIEW PDF and EDIT. Do not click the edit unless you want to pull it out of our database, make changes, and then resubmit it. If you click VIEW PDF you will get the report.

33. ESAMS VS WESS

As long as you have a WESS account then you can put some entries into ESAMS and they will be auto-fed to WESS. You may get an e-mail from us here requesting additional information because ESAMS only collects what CNIC wants to see and not what the DOD/DON require.

With our new modules that are out (AFLOAT, MOTOR VEHICLE), you will have to put them in twice because our technology is more advanced than ESAMS so we cannot get a data feed from them. Our SHORE/GROUND module will be out shortly so even then you will have to dual report all injuries. You have never been able to put Aviation into ESAMS.

ESAMS is a CNIC programs that only collects information for the Installation Commands. It is not used by the Marine Corps, ships, shipyards, overseas, most aviation squadrons (unless your base assists you with safety and mandates it). WESS is the official DOD/DON mishap and hazard report system for all Navy and Marine Corps. ESAMS is great for tracking things; however, they do not give the overall picture to the upper Chain of Command (CNO, SYSTEMS COMMANDS, ETC) on the actual numbers of mishaps and hazards. When the upper Echelons, systems commands, and CNO/CMC need safety information, mitigation strategies, what to spend money on, they do not call CNIC. They call us because they want to know if there is a trend in the Navy and/or Marine Corps. They can then decide if they want to spend money or prioritize higher any issues that are endangering our personnel and equipment. If we do not have the reports in our system, they cannot always justify spending money on fixing these issues. When reports are filed in ESAMS, but not in WESS, the decision makers are not getting the true picture of what is affecting the safety of their personnel.

I had a phone call recently from a PMA, trying to decide what simulator to spend money on of the two he had requests from. One community had filed many hazard reports documenting the need for a new/upgraded simulator and the other one had not. Guess who got the money. Another example is, when CNIC took over the bases, they did not fund BASH programs, so we were getting many aircraft damaged/destroyed due to BASH issues. Aviation commands starting filing every BASH report whether it caused damage or not. The numbers increased so much that Controlling Custodians got involved, had discussions with CNIC, and now almost all of our airfields have funded BASH programs.

Public Affairs Officer Aviation Mishap Guidance

(Updated: 21 May 2010)

References:

1. SECNAVINST 5720.44B - Navy Public Affairs Policy and Regulations
2. OPNAV INST 3750.6R - Naval Aviation Safety Program
3. JAG INST 5800.7D - Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN)
4. COMNAVAIRFORINST 5420.1 - Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB) Procedures

Do's and Don'ts:

- **Do not** speculate on the cause.
- **Do not** get involved in "off the record" discussions. Everything you say to a reporter is on the record.
- **Do not** promise the media or family access or copies of the safety investigation report (SIR). You can tell them that they can request a redacted copy under the Freedom of Information Act. FOIA requests can be submitted to the Naval Safety Center either in writing or electronically through our website at <http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/foia/requestform.cfm>
- **Do** prepare. Coordinate with standing Aviation Mishap Boards (AMB) (every squadron is required to have one) and participate in unit and base level mishap exercises.
- **Do** coordinate with Naval Safety Center public affairs. Call 757-444-3520 Ext. 7312 (DSN 564) with any questions or concerns. NAVSAFECEN public affairs personnel can and will help ensure you are in compliance with Navy/Marine Corps instructions regarding release of information.

Sample Questions & Answers:

Q: "What Caused this Accident?"

A: "A safety investigation is being (will be) carried out to determine the cause."

Q: "Were there any injuries or fatalities?"

A: You can provide basic information if known, but do not release names.

Q: "What type (model) of aircraft was involved?"

A: You can provide the type, model and series (T/M/S) if known.

Q: "What was the mission?"

A: "The aircraft was conducting (provide general description) (routine training, passenger transfer between A and B, support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, etc.)"

Q: "What Squadron was the aircraft from?"

A: Provide the unit name.

Q: "When will the investigation be complete?"

A: "The safety investigation report (SIR) is to be submitted within 30 days of the mishap; however, extensions to this can be granted depending upon circumstances. Once submitted, the SIR is reviewed and formally endorsed through the chain of command. This process can take several months. The Naval Safety Center is the final endorser of all Class A aviation mishaps. The process is not complete until the final endorsement is completed.

Q: "Will the report be published?"

A: "No, Safety Investigation Reports are not published."

Q: "Can I submit a FOIA (Freedom of Information) request for the Safety Investigation Report?"

A: "Yes. However, keep in mind that any privileged safety information and information protected by the Privacy Act will be redacted. "Safety Privilege" allows investigators to offer a promise of confidentiality to witnesses who may be reluctant to make a statement in an attempt to learn the most accurate, detailed information about the cause of a mishap. Safety privilege also protects information derived from statements given under a promise of confidentiality, information that pertains to the deliberative process of the investigation board, and pre-decisional information, including endorsements. This privilege can be offered because the safety investigation does not determine responsibility but rather root causes and ways to mitigate the associated risks.

The JAGMAN investigation is not protected by the concept of privilege and in most cases can be released under FOIA. In cases where the United States anticipates being sued as a result of a mishap, the JAGMAN may be prepared as a litigation report, in which case it will not be releasable."

Aviation Mishap Investigation Process Background Information

Types of investigations: Aircraft accidents are investigated by one or more investigative bodies under existing instructions and legal requirements.

Mishap safety investigations. For the sole purpose of safety and accident prevention, the Chief of Naval Operations has issued special instructions for the conduct, analysis, and review of investigations of aircraft mishaps in OPNAVINST 3750.6 series. These investigations are known as "aircraft mishap safety investigations" and are conducted by Aviation Mishap Boards (AMB). The mishap investigation is a search for causes; it looks for undetected hazards and tries to identify those factors that caused the mishap, as well as those that caused any additional damage or injury during the course of the mishap. The results of the safety investigation are documented in Safety Investigation Reports (SIR). When submitted, these reports are then endorsed by the chain of command. Endorsers can disagree with the determined causes and associated recommendations and suggest other causes or recommendations for corrective action. For this reason, the report is not considered final or closed until the final endorsement is made to the report. For Class A mishap the Naval Safety Center is the final endorser.

JAGMAN Investigation. When an aircraft mishap results in death or serious injury, extensive damage to government property, or the possibility of a claim exists for or against the government, a JAGMAN investigation shall be ordered to determine the cause and responsibility for the mishap, nature and extent of any injuries, description of all damage to property, and any attendant circumstances. While in most cases a claim for or against the government may reasonably be anticipated as a result of an aircraft mishap, a *command investigation* will normally be used because of the command interest in accountability for incidents which result in death or substantial property damage. In all investigations concerning potential claims for or against the government, a copy of the investigation shall be forwarded to the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Code 15), Tort Claims Unit, 9620 Maryland Avenue, Suite 100, Norfolk, VA 23511-2989 upon completion of the convening authority's endorsement. These JAGMAN investigations are in addition to and separate from the aircraft accident safety investigations conducted under the authority of OPNAVINST 3750.6 series.

Field Naval Aviator Evaluation Board (FNAEB) / Field Flight Performance Board (FFPB). A FNAEB is a Navy administrative board convened to evaluate the performance, potential and motivation for continued service of any Naval Aviator ordered by competent authority to appear before such a board. A FFPB is the USMC equivalent. A FNAEB/FFPB shall be convened for all Class A and B flight mishaps except in those cases where the aircrew's performance is not in question. Through a formal

review process and hearing, the board will make a recommendation to the chain of command on whether the aviator in question should continue in a flight status or not. The governing instruction is COMNAVAIRFORINST 5420.1.

Aviation Mishap Board (AMB). An AMB is required for all Class A, B and C mishaps (see below for classification definitions). Minimum AMB membership shall consist of four officers drawn from the command's standing board: An Aviation Safety Officer (Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) course graduate), a flight surgeon, an officer well-qualified in aircraft maintenance, and an officer well-qualified in aircraft operations. The senior member of each AMB shall be a Naval Aviator or Naval Flight Officer.

Naval Safety Center (NSC) Involvement. NSC's involvement takes the form of help with the mishap board's investigation. In Class A flight mishaps where wreckage is available or a fatality is involved, NSC will generally send an experienced aviation mishap investigator to assist the AMB. In cases involving wreckage lost at sea, an investigator will not normally be dispatched until the commencement of any ocean salvage desired by the controlling custodian of the mishap aircraft. NSC investigators are direct representatives of the CNO; they control all evidence pertaining to the mishap (including parts undergoing engineering investigations) until they release it to the AMB. NSC investigator may invite additional experts, military or non-military, to assist in the investigation and provide analysis to the board.

Privileged Information.

Concept: Much of the information associated with a Safety Investigation is "privileged". This information includes: witness statements given under a promise of confidentiality; all AMB deliberations and analysis (to include written and verbal comments); any information which would not have been discovered but for information provided under a promise of confidentiality; and associated endorsements. Privileged safety information is not releasable under the Freedom of Information Act and shall be used ONLY for safety purposes. The promise of confidentiality offered by privilege is to: 1) overcome any reluctance of an individual to reveal complete and candid information about the circumstances surrounding a mishap, and 2) encourage AMBs and endorsers of aviation SIRs to provide complete, open and forthright information, opinions and recommendations regarding a mishap.

Protection of Privileged Information: Should privileged information be used for any purpose other than safety, credibility of future assurances would be lost. Therefore, we must keep faith with the assurances of the limited use of this information. The following statement is included in each SIR and subsequent endorsement and captures the seriousness of violating this protection.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THIS IS A PRIVILEGED, LIMITED-USE, LIMITED-DISTRIBUTION, SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT OR ITS SUPPORTING ENCLOSURES BY MILITARY PERSONNEL IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE PUNISHABLE UNDER ARTICLE 92, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT OR ITS SUPPORTING ENCLOSURES BY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WILL SUBJECT THEM TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION UNDER 5 USC 7503, 7405, 7513, 7514, 7121, 7701, 7702 and 7703. THIS REPORT MAY NOT BE RELEASED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, EXCEPT BY THE COMMANDER NAVAL SAFETY CENTER.

Releasing Information:

COMNAVSAFECEN is sole authorized release authority for Navy and Marine Corps safety investigation information. All requests for information (except those appropriately routed to COMNAVSAFECEN PAO) should be directed to COMNAVSAFECEN Attn: Code 055 (Staff Attorney).

Media: Mishap information derived from the Mishap Data Report (Initial Notification) message may be released to news media pursuant to DON Public Affairs Regulations (SECNAVINST 5720.44B). We must, when dealing with the press, the public and Congress, protect the privileged status of SIRs and their endorsements.

Privacy Act of 1974. Persons desiring information collected in a system of records subject to the Privacy Act shall forward requests to COMNAVSAFECEN, Attn: Code 055.

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Forward any requests for information that either expresses or implies they are based on the Freedom of Information Act to COMNAVSAFECEN, Attn: Code 055.

Congress. Forward requests for information from the Congress, its committees, or members to COMNAVSAFECEN Attn: Code 055.

Relatives of Persons Involved in Aviation Mishaps. The Naval Military Personnel Manual and the Marine Corps Casualty Procedures Manual define how to notify relatives of persons involved in aviation mishaps. Make no reference to causal

factors of a mishap. Do not provide classified information. Do not show, discuss or give an aviation SIR or endorsements to the next of kin or their representative. Next of kin requests for the SIR must be submitted in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act. Such requests must be submitted in writing or electronically at

<http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/foia/requestform.cfm>

Subpoenas for Information. Refer any subpoenas for aviation mishap information to the Navy JAG (Code 34), 1322 Patterson Avenue SE, Suite 3000, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066 with copy to COMNAVSAFECEN, Attn: Code 055

Terms:

Controlling Custodians. The Controlling Custodian is basically the 'owner' of the aircraft. For purposes of OPNAV 3750.6 and without effecting command relationships established for other purposes, controlling custodians are:

CMC

Commander, Naval Air Forces (COMNAVAIRFOR)

Commander, Naval Air Forces U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(COMNAVAIRLANT)

Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic (COMMARFORCOM)

Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Pacific (COMMARFORPAC)

Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA)

Commanding General, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing (CG FOURTH
MAW)

Commander, Naval Air Force Reserve (COMNAVAIRFORES)

Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (COMNAVAIRSYSCOM)

Reporting Custodians. The reporting custodian is typically the unit, squadron or command physically operating the aircraft and falls under one of the controlling custodians listed above.

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